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THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION, PRIMARY
EVIDENCE, AND THE EMASCULATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule ordinarily bars the admission of evidence ob-
tained by the government in violation of the Constitution.' The rule ex-
tends beyond the direct products of illegal government conduct to
evidence derived from illegal conduct,2 or "fruit of the poisonous tree."3
1. The Supreme Court first adopted the exclusionary rule in 1886 in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a case involving self-incrimination. See B. Wilson, Enforcing
the Fourth Amendment 48 (1986). The rule applies to violations of the fourth amend-
ment, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388 (1914), fifth amendment, see Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964), and sixth amendment. See Nix v. Wil-
liams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-40 (1967). The
exclusionary rule also has been applied to statutory violations. See, e.g., Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339-40 (1939) (excluding evidence obtained in violation of
wiretapping statute).
Although for many years the exclusionary rule only applied in federal court proceed-
ings, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), the Court has extended the
exclusionary rule, through the fourteenth amendment, to prohibit the introduction of
unlawfully obtained evidence in state courts. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961). Although the Court has held that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally re-
quired, see id. at 648-49, recently the Court has indicated otherwise. See United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (the rule is a" 'judicially created remedy... rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved' ") (quoting United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). But see Leon, 468 U.S. at 931-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that exclusionary rule is constitutionally required). If the exclusionary rule is
not constitutionally required, then it cannot be imposed on state courts via the fourteenth
amendment. See id. at 940 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because the Court has not expressly
overruled Mapp, confusion exists whether the rule is required.
There is a strong argument that, unlike fourth amendment violations in which the
constitutional violation is the unreasonable search and not the admission of the evidence,
a sixth amendment violation occurs when the evidence is admitted at trial. See United
States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1983) (balancing approach impermissible to
determine admissibility of statement obtained in violation of sixth amendment); Bishop v.
Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983) (admission of evidence is separate and addi-
tional violation of sixth amendment); Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich. L
Rev. 865, 889 (1981) (sixth amendment violation occurs when evidence is admitted at
trial). If the admission of the evidence is a constitutional violation in itself, the exclusion-
ary rule is constitutionally required for sixth amendment violations. But see Maine v.
Molton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 495-96 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (advocating balancing
approach to determine admissibility, thereby rejecting any contention that exclusion is
constitutionally required).
2. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (to forbid direct use of
illegal conduct without curbing indirect use of illegal conduct, would invite illegal activ-
ity); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("The essence of
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all."); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (in deciding
whether evidence has been derived from illegal conduct, question is not whether evidence
would have come to light "but for" illegal conduct, but rather whether evidence has been
obtained by exploitation of illegality).
3. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Justice Frankfurter's termi-
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Although the rule originally was established to deter official misconduct4
and preserve the integrity of the judicial system,5 the judicial integrity
rationale has lost favor in recent years6 leading the courts to invoke the
exclusionary rule primarily to deter illegal conduct.7 Recognizing the
cost imposed on society by the exclusionary rule,' the Supreme Court has
nology gave rise to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which has been used exten-
sively in exclusionary rule cases. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); J. Hall, Search and Seizure § 22
(1982 & Supp. 1986); Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized,
56 Calif. L. Rev. 579 (1968). The term fruit of the poisonous tree is synonymous with
"derivative" evidence, "secondary" evidence, see 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 11.4, at 370 (2d ed. 1987), and "indirect product"
of illegal activity. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484.
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence that is the indirect result of
illegal police activity. In Nardone, the fruit of the poisonous tree was evidence that had
become accessible to the police by use of unlawful wiretaps. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 339.
The illegally intercepted telephone conversations clearly were inadmissible. See id. The
defendant was given an opportunity to prove that other testimony that had been admitted
against him had been derived from the telephone conversations. See id. at 341. All evi-
dence that the defendant could prove had been derived from the illegal conduct also
would be admissible. See id.
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (exclusionary rule is constitutionally
required "deterrent safeguard"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (pur-
pose of exclusionary rule is "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it").
5. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at
222); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (same); see also J. Hall, supra note 3,
§ 20:6, at 584-85 (1982) (discussing deterrence and judicial integrity rationales for exclu-
sionary rule).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (" 'prime purpose' of the
rule, if not the sole one," is deterrence) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347 (1974)); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976) (judicial integrity rationale has
limited justification for exclusion of probative evidence); see also Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
4-6 (1975) (discussing Court's recent disfavor of integrity rationale); Wasserstorm & Mer-
tens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 85, 87 (1984) (same).
The Supreme Court recently has suggested that the deterrence and judicial integrity
rationales are the same. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984)
(whether admission of illegally obtained evidence "offends the integrity of the court 'is
essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent pur-
pose' ") (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 n.35 (1976)).
7. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
8. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (exclusion interferes with
truth-finding process and may " 'generat[e] disrespect for the law and the administration
of justice' ") (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)); Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (exclusion of probative evidence is "drastic and socially costly
course"; high social cost is letting obviously guilty people go free); State v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (exclusion of relevant evidence often harms society by
permitting criminal "to go free because the constable has blundered"), cert. denied, 270
U.S. 657 (1926); see also J. Hirschel, Fourth Amendment Rights 13-15 (1979) (discussing
alleged ineffectiveness of rule, cost to administration of justice and alleged hampering of
legitimate police activity); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule,
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developed exceptions9 that apply when the deterrent purpose would not
25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971) (criticizing rule and proposing alternatives to protect individual
rights).
9. The Court announced the first exception to the exclusionary rule in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The "independent source" exception
allows the admission of illegally discovered evidence if it was also discovered by an in-
dependent legal source. See id. at 392. The independent legal source for the evidence
removes the taint from the poisonous fruit by providing a "clean path" to the evidence.
See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 87, 123 (1984)
[hereinafter Supreme Court]; see also Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Con-
stitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 88, 89 n.13 (1974) [hereinafter Inevita-
ble Discovery] (independent source for evidence breaks causal link between illegal conduct
and acquisition of evidence).
The Court established a second exception, "attenuation," in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939). Although "sophisticated argument" could prove a causal relation-
ship between illegal conduct and challenged evidence, the Court stated that "such con-
nection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 341. In effect,
the attenuation exception places a limit on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court further clarified the attenua-
tion doctrine stating that the question to be answered as to derivative evidence is
"'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" Id. at 488 (quoting J.
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).
Recently, the Court recognized a third exception, the inevitable discovery rule. Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). This rule admits illegally obtained evidence that inevita-
bly would have been discovered by legal means. Id. at 444. In essence, it is a "hypotheti-
cal independent source" exception. The term "hypothetical independent source" more
accurately describes the exception than does the common appellation "inevitable discov-
ery." See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921
(1980). The court, however, used the latter in light of its "overwhelming use" by other
courts and commentators. Id. at 256 n.3.
Finally, the Court has recognized a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). This exception allows the admission of
evidence obtained in a search pursuant to an invalid warrant if the police were objectively
reasonable in relying on the validity of the warrant. See id. at 913. The good faith excep-
tion is the only exception that clearly applies to primary evidence. See J. Hall, supra note
3, §§ 22:5-22:7, 22:11-22:15, 23:3 (discussing independent source, attenuation, and inevi-
table discovery exceptions in chapter on fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, and discuss-
ing good faith exception in separate chapter on exclusionary rule); Project, Fourteenth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 73 Geo. L.J. 243, 388, 392 (1984) [hereinafter
Criminal Procedure] (discussing good faith exception as exception to exclusionary rule in
general, and discussing independent source, attenuation and inevitable discovery excep-
tions as exceptions to fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine only).
The good faith exception recently has been extended to admit evidence obtained under
objectively reasonable reliance on an unconstitutional statute. See Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.
Ct. 1160, 1167-68 (1987).
In addition to the four exceptions, the scope of the exclusionary rule has been limited
"to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). On this reasoning, the Court has
held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings, see id. at 351-52,
in civil proceedings, see I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976), for impeachment purposes in criminal trials, see
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980), or to challenge a state conviction in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding, when the state provided "an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95
(1976).
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be achieved."1
One such exception, the inevitable discovery rule, admits illegally ob-
tained evidence that the court finds ultimately would have been obtained
by legal means." Recently, confusion has arisen as to the scope of this
exception. The exception clearly applies to the fruit of the poisonous
tree, or derivative evidence, 2 but the courts are divided as to whether the
exception also should apply to primary evidence. 13  Although the
Supreme Court has suggested that the exception is limited to derivative
evidence,' 4 the Court has not clarified whether primary evidence ever is
10. The deterrence rationale does not apply to illegally obtained evidence that is also
obtained through an independent legal source, because the government is not put in a
better position as a result of the illegal conduct. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443
(1984). Rather, the police are put in the same position they would have been in if no
illegal conduct had occurred. See id.
Nor does the deterrence rationale apply to attenuated evidence. See United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978) ("Application of the exclusionary rule in [an attenua-
tion] situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of [a police]
officer .... "); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1047 (5th Cir. 1980) (attenua-
tion exception is justified because it is unlikely that suppression of attenuated derivative
evidence would deter police misconduct).
The inevitable discovery exception similarly is justified because excluding evidence that
inevitably would have been discovered through legal means would not deter police mis-
conduct. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).
Finally, the good faith exception is based on the reasoning that, "[p]enalizing the of-
ficer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921
(1984).
11. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984). For a general discussion of the
inevitable discovery exception, see Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical In-
dependent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 137, 154-64
(1976).
12. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (applying inevitable discovery
exception to derivative evidence-testimony concerning condition and location of vic-
tim's body).
13. Compare United States v. Pimentel, 810 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding
that inevitable discovery exception applies to primary as well as derivative evidence);
United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 307 (8th Cir.) (admitting primary evidence
although court acknowledged that inevitable discovery exception is usually applied to
derivative evidence), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984) with People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d
313, 319, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (1987) (refusing to apply inevitable
discovery exception to primary evidence); State v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (inevitable discovery exception most frequently is applied to deriv-
ative evidence and it is inapplicable to primary evidence), cert. granted, 717 P.2d 504
(1986); People v. Young, 159 Cal. App. 3d 138, 205 Cal. Rptr. 402, 409 (1984) (inevitable
discovery exception applies only to evidence obtained as indirect product of other evi-
dence illegally seized); Hernandez v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 355, 361, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 127, 130 (1980) (same); State v. Crossen, 21 Or. App. 835, 838, 536 P.2d 1263,
1264 (1975) ("The inevitable discovery rule has been applied only to purge the taint from
derivative, not primary, evidence and we see no reason.., to extend it to the latter.").
See also Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 165 n.4, 423 A.2d 552, 557 n.4 (1980) (discussing
split in authority over applying inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence).
14. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court noted:
While neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves nor any testimony
describing his having led the police to the victim's body [primary evidence] can
constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was
1224 [Vol. 55
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admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.' 5
This Note argues that permitting the prosecution to use the direct
products of official misconduct at trial substantially weakens the protec-
tions afforded by the fourth amendment. 6 Part I of this Note discusses
the Supreme Court's adoption of the inevitable discovery exception. Part
II discusses the distinction between primary and derivative evidence and
the implications of applying the inevitable discovery exception to pri-
mary evidence. Part III argues that in light of the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to apply the independent source exception to primary evidence, it is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent to apply the inevitable dis-
covery exception to primary evidence, and therefore primary evidence
should not be admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S ADOPTION OF THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY RULE
In Nix v. Williams (Williams II)" the Supreme Court adopted the in-
evitable discovery rule, 8 forty years after it was first applied by lower
courts as an exception to the exclusionary rule. '9 Williams II arose from
found and of its condition [derivative evidence] might well be admissible on the
theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incrim-
inating statements not been elicited from Williams.
Id at 407 n.12.
15. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the admissibility of the primary evidence
was not at issue, because the government did not seek to admit the primary evidence at
trial. See id. at 437. The Court earlier had noted in dictum, however, that it would be
unconstitutional to admit primary evidence on grounds of inevitable discovery. See
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 407 n.12 (1977) (quoted supra note 14).
The Court may take the opportunity to resolve the issue in a case in which the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit applied the inevitable discovery exception to primary evi-
dence. See United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 1368 (1987).
16. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The direct product of a fifth or sixth amendment violation is testimony. It is difficult
for the prosecution to prove that testimony inevitably would have been discovered. Thus,
extending the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence is less likely to diminish
fifth and sixth amendment protections than fourth amendment protections. In light of
the low standard of proof required by the Supreme Court, however, see Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (requiring proof of inevitable discovery by preponderance of
evidence), it is possible that the prosecution could prove inevitable discovery of testimony
and that fifth and sixth amendment rights will be impinged if the inevitable discovery
exception is applied to primary evidence.
17. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
18. See id. at 444.
19. The first clear application of the inevitable discovery rule occurred in Somer v.
United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943). See 4 W. LaFave, supra note 3, § 11.4, at
379. In Somer, federal agents illegally searched the defendant's apartment. Somer, 138
1987] 1225
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an earlier case, Brewer v. Williams (Williams I)2 in which the Court had
affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief to the defendant.2 1
In Williams , the defendant had been convicted for the murder of a
ten-year-old girl.22 At trial, certain incriminating statements made by
the defendant, and testimony concerning the condition and location of
the victim's body, had been admitted into evidence over the defendant's
objections. 23 The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the defendant's
conviction because the evidence admitted against him had been obtained
in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel.2u The Court held
that, by subjecting the defendant to a manipulative "Christian burial
speech,"'2 the police had deliberately elicited the defendant's incriminat-
F.2d at 791. While the police were in the defendant's home, the defendant's wife told
them that the defendant would be returning shortly. See id. The agents arrested the
defendant upon his return and then found illicit liquor in his car. See id. The evidence
discovered in the car was admissible upon a showing that the agents would have waited
for the defendant independently of what the defendant's wife had told them. See id.
Before the Supreme Court adopted the inevitable discovery exception, every circuit
having jurisdiction over criminal matters had endorsed the exception. See Wayne v.
United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); United
States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914 (Ist Cir. 1980); United States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d
780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042,
1044 (5th Cir. 1980); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1035 (1981); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 306-07 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); United States v.
Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1065-66 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 881 (1978); United
States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wilson, 671 F.2d
1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 844 (1982).
The courts of appeals differed on the burden of proof necessary to determine the inevi-
tability of legal discovery. Compare Gereau, 502 F.2d at 927 (requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence) with United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)
(requiring proof by preponderance of evidence), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). See also J. Hall, supra note 3, § 22:13, at 637 & n. 19 (courts
differ on burden of proof); Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 123 n.45 (noting that lower
courts had more stringent versions of exception than that adopted by Supreme Court).
The Supreme Court has since held that the appropriate standard of proof is a preponder-
ance of the evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
20. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
21. See id. at 406.
22. See id. at 389-90.
23. See id. at 393-94.
24. See id. at 406.
25. See id. at 392. The defendant was arrested for the abduction of a young girl who
was missing and was last seen in Des Moines, Iowa. See Williams , 430 U.S. at 390.
Unaccompanied by his lawyer, he was transported by the police from Davenport to Des
Moines. See id. at 390-91. The police had agreed with the defendant's counsel not to
question the defendant during the journey. See id. One of the police officers, Detective
Learning, knew that the defendant was a former mental patient and that he was deeply
religious. See id. at 392. During the journey, Detective Learning, addressing the defend-
ant as "Reverend," said that they were predicting several inches of snow overnight and
that probably nobody would be able to find the body once it was covered with snow, and
he felt they should stop and locate the body because "the parents of this little girl should
be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
INEVITABLE DISCO VER Y
ing statements which led them to the body.
The State of Iowa retried the defendant.2 6 In the second trial, the de-
fendant's incriminating statements were not admitted into evidence, but
testimony relating to the condition and location of the body was admit-
ted.27 The Supreme Court approved the second murder conviction28 in
Williams II by adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.29 The Court held that illegally obtained evidence is admis-
sible if the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information "ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means." 3 Although the evidence admitted at trial concerning the
location and condition of the victim's body was obtained in violation of
the sixth amendment," at the time the police illegally interrogated the
defendant approximately 200 volunteers were searching for the body.3"
The Court held that the evidence respecting the body was admissible be-
cause it inevitably would have been discovered by the search party.33
The Court justified the inevitable discovery exception by stating that
the exclusionary rule seeks to restore the police to the same position they
would have been in absent the illegality.34 The Court reasoned that ex-
cluding evidence that inevitably would have been discovered puts the po-
lice in a worse position than they would have occupied. 35 Admitting the
evidence does not put them in a better position because they would have
discovered the evidence even absent the illegal conduct.36 Thus, the ad-
mission of evidence under the inevitable discovery exception restores the
"status quo ante."' 37
Christmas Eve and murdered." Id. at 392-93. The defendant then directed the police to
the body. See id. at 393. See generally, Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and
Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 Geo. LJ. 1, 1-24 (1978)
(discussing "Christian burial speech").
26. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 437 (1984).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 450. The Iowa court convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and
sentenced him to life imprisonment. See id. at 438. The conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Iowa, State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979), and the District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the defendant's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664, 675 (S.D. Iowa 1981), rey'd, 700
F.2d 1164 (1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus relief, see Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173
(1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), and the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 450 (1984).
29. Williams rI, 467 U.S. at 444.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 437.
32. See id. at 448. Teams of volunteers were assigned to systematically search differ-
ent areas. See id. at 449. The body was discovered two and one-half miles from where
the volunteers had been searching, in a culvert that was one of the kinds of places the
teams had been directed to search. See id.
33. Id. at 449-50.
34. See id. at 443.
35. See id. at 443-44.
36. See id.
37. See Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 122.
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Although in Williams II, the inevitable discovery rule was used to ad-
mit derivative evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's sixth
amendment rights, 8 lower courts have extended the holding to apply to
fourth and fifth amendment violations.39
II. PRIMARY V DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE
Primary evidence is evidence obtained directly from the illegal con-
duct.40 Derivative evidence is evidence derived from or "come at by ex-
ploitation of "4 the illegal activity. 2 For example, in Williams II, the
defendant's incriminating statements were primary evidence and the
body was derivative evidence.43 An illegal search may result in the police
obtaining a confession,' or discovering a witness who is willing to testify
against the defendant,45 or uncovering facts that lead to another search. 6
Any evidence discovered in the illegal search is primary evidence. The
confession, the witness's testimony, or the evidence found in the second
search is derivative evidence.
Although the Supreme Court has applied the inevitable discovery ex-
ception only to derivative evidence,47 some lower courts have extended
the exception to primary evidence.48 Other courts have expressly refused
38. Williams I, 467 U.S. at 437.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Gallegos, 807 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1987)
(fifth amendment); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1985)
(fourth amendment), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 932 (1987).
40. See 4 W. LaFave, supra note 3, § 11.4, at 369; LaCount & Girese, The "Inevitable
Discovery" Rule, an Evolving Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 40 Al-
bany L. Rev. 438, 507 (1976).
41. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting J. Maguire, Evi-
dence of Guilt 221 (1959)).
42. See 4.W. LaFave, supra note 3, at 369-70; LaCount & Girese, supra note 40, at
507; see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349,
361 (1974) (discussing difficulties in determining whether evidence is derivative).
43. 467 U.S. 431 (1984); see infra note 47.
44. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (illegal entry
and unauthorized arrest resulted in defendant's confession, which was a "fruit" of the
illegality); People v. Milaski, 62 N.Y.2d 147, 156-57, 464 N.E.2d 472, 477, 476 N.Y.S.2d
104, 109 (1984) (confession, obtained four days after unlawful seizure of weapons, should
have been suppressed).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1978); United States v.
White, 746 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985)
46. See J. Hall, supra note 3, § 22:8.
47. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the Court held that testimony concern-
ing the location and condition of the victim's body, which was derivative evidence, was
admissible. See id. at 437. The primary evidence, the defendant's incriminating state-
ments and testimony that he had led the police to the body, had not been admitted into
evidence. See id. The admissibility of the primary evidence therefore was not at issue.
The Court earlier had indicated, however, that the primary evidence constitutionally
could not be admitted under the inevitable discovery exception. See Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 407 n.12 (1977).
48. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly held that the inevitable
discovery exception applies to primary evidence. See United States v. Pimentel, 810 F.2d
366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987). This decision seems inconsistent with the Second Circuit's ear-
lier holding that primary evidence is not admissible under the independent source excep-
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to apply the inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence.49
tion, see United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd without opinion,
697 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), but the court
did not discuss the inconsistency. It is inconsistent to admit primary evidence under the
inevitable discovery exception but refuse to admit primary evidence under the independ-
ent source exception because the inevitable discovery exception is merely a "hypothetical
independent source" exception. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. The Eighth
Circuit has admitted primary evidence under the inevitable discovery exception, despite
acknowledging that the rule usually is applied to derivative evidence. See United States
v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 307 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984). Other courts
have admitted primary evidence under the inevitable discovery exception without distin-
guishing between primary and derivative evidence. See, ag., United States v. Whitehorn,
813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987) (admitting evidence discovered in illegal search that
subsequently was discovered in warranted search); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d
736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (same), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. June 2,
1986) (No. 86-678); United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986) (ad-
mitting evidence found in illegal search and subsequently discovered in valid inventory
search), aff'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Moscatiello,
771 F.2d 589, 604 (1st Cir. 1985) (admitting evidence discovered in illegal search that
was subsequently discovered in warranted search), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987);
United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1497 (1986); United States v. Woolbright, 641 F. Supp. 1570, 1577-78 (E.D. Mo.
1986) (admitting evidence obtained in illegal search because it inevitably would have been
discovered in inventory search); United States v. Martinez, 625 F. Supp. 384, 392-93 (D.
Del. 1985) (same); United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(admitting evidence discovered in illegal search because police would have discovered
evidence in subsequent warranted search); State v. Nelson, 127 Misc. 2d 583, 587, 486
N.Y.S.2d 979, 984-85 (1985) (admitting evidence discovered in illegal search because it
would have been discovered in inventory search); State v. Ferguson, 678 S.W.2d 873, 877
(Mo. CL App. 1984) (same).
49. See People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 319, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201,
204 (1987) (refusing to apply inevitable discovery exception to primary evidence because
it "would be an unacceptable dilution of the exclusionary rule"); United States v. Massey,
437 F. Supp. 843, 853 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (inevitable discovery exception allows admis-
sion of derivative evidence only); People v. Young, 205 Cal. Rptr. 402, 409 (1984) (same);
Hernandez v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 355, 361, 185 Cal. Rptr. 127, 130 (1980)
(same); State v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (The inevitable
discovery exception, "is most frequently applied to purge the taint from derivative evi-
dence, not primary evidence which is the direct product of the illegal search.... [There-
fore] the inevitable discovery rule is inapplicable to rehabilitate evidence which has been
seized during a search conducted in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights.") (citations omitted), cert. granted, 717 P.2d 504 (1986); State v. Crossen, 21 Or.
App. 835, 838, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (1975) ("The inevitable discovery rule has been ap-
plied only to purge the taint from derivative, not primary, evidence and [there is] no
reason in this case to extend it to the latter.").
Other courts, while not expressly rejecting the application of the inevitable discovery
exception to primary evidence, nevertheless have refused to apply it to primary evidence.
See United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846-47 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (refusing to admit
evidence obtained in illegal search when warrant could have been obtained but police had
not initiated process of obtaining warrant at time of misconduct), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1117 (1985); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (refusing
to apply inevitable discovery rule on grounds that police could have obtained warrant,
because "[a]ny other view would tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 218-19, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1981) ("[W]e decline to
apply the [inevitable discovery] rule in a situation where its effect would be to read out of
the Constitution the requirement that the police follow certain protective procedures-in
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The inevitable discovery exception, even as applied to derivative evi-
dence, has been criticized as colliding with the fundamental purpose of
the exclusionary rule.5 0 Critics contend that the exception "encourage[s]
police shortcuts whenever evidence can be more readily obtained by ille-
gal than by legal means."'" Moreover, there is concern that "'sophisti-
cated argument' aided by hindsight can be used to show what the police
would have done in a given situation, 51 2 to the extent that illegally dis-
covered evidence will be admitted based on imagined investigations, hy-
pothetical search warrants, and unjustified assumptions about the
likelihood that evidence would not have been removed, altered, or
destroyed.
In attempting to limit the inevitable discovery exception, 3 courts have
required such safeguards as proof of inevitable discovery by clear and
convincing evidence,54 proof of the absence of bad faith of the
this case, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."); People v. Knapp, 52
N.Y.2d 689, 698, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1981) (warrantless nonex-
igent seizure cannot be legitimized by assuming hypothetical alternative that warrant had
been obtained); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D. 1981) ("If the inevitable
discovery theory applied when a short cut [failure to obtain a warrant], was taken .... the
net result would be that the magistrate's determination of probable cause as required by
the fourth amendment would be eliminated for all practical purposes.").
50. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 63-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 839 (1981); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir.),
modified, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 489 (2d
Cir. 1962); People v. Ramsey, 272 Cal. App. 2d 302, 313-14, 77 Cal. Rptr, 249, 256
(1969); State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980); see also Pitler, supra note 3, at
630 ("The preservation of the exclusionary rule as a viable deterrent to illicit police activ-
ity requires the spotlight to focus 'on actualities not probabilities.' ") (quoting United
States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1962).
51. Inevitable Discovery, supra note 9, at 99; see United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1962); People v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 665, 681, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 795, 804 (1978); Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for Relevant
Criteria, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1136, 1143 (1967); Note, supra note 11, at 159.
Because the police are "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime," Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), they seek incriminating evi-
dence in the most efficient way. When illegally obtained evidence is admissible, the illegal
route may be the most efficient.
52. Inevitable Discovery, supra note 9, at 155 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). The Supreme Court has expressed concern that sophisticated ar-
gument could prove a connection between illegal conduct and evidence sought to be ad-
mitted at trial, see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Where the
connection is highly attenuated, the evidence is not excluded. See id.
53. Most of the criticism of the inevitable discovery rule is aimed "not so much to the
rule itself as to its application in a loose and unthinking fashion." 4 W. LaFave, supra
note 3, § 11.4(a), at 381. "In carving out the 'inevitable discovery' exception to the taint
doctrine, courts must use a surgeon's scalpel and not a meat axe." Id.; see also J. Hall,
supra note 3, § 22:14, at 640 & nn.11-12 (criticizing courts for inadequately explaining
their use of inevitable discovery exception).
54. See Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 927 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 909 (1975); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that clear and convincing evidence standard should be required); J. Hall,
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police,55 and proof that at the time of the misconduct, the police pos-
sessed and actively were pursuing the leads that would have resulted in
discovery. 6 The Supreme Court, however, has since required proof of
inevitable discovery by a mere preponderence of the evidence, 7 and has
rejected an absence of bad faith requirement.5" The third safeguard, that
the police must have been engaged in an ongoing investigation at the time
of the misconduct, remains a matter of controversy. 9 Given that the
Supreme Court has loosened the reins on the application of the inevitable
discovery exception, extending the exception to primary evidence will se-
riously diminish fourth amendment rights.
The exclusionary rule is the primary safeguard of fourth amendment
supra note 3, § 22:13, at 637 n. 19 (citing cases that apply different burdens of proof for
inevitable discovery).
55. See State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Iowa 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S.
921 (1980); State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980).
56. See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing United
States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 932
(1987); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1117 (1985); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982).
57. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444. But see State v. Sugar, 100 NJ. 214, 240,
495 A.2d 90, 103-04 (N.J. 1985) (rejecting Williams HI, preponderance standard and ap-
plying clear and convincing standard as matter of state law).
58. See Williams HI, 467 U.S. at 445.
59. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required an ongoing investigation as a
prerequisite to the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine before Williams II was
decided. See United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980) ("the police
must show that when the illegality occurred they possessed and were actively pursuing
the evidence or leads that would have led to the discovery of the challenged [evidence]").
The Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed that requirement since the Supreme Court's adoption of
the inevitable discovery rule in Williams 11. See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196,
1204-05 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 107 S. CL 932 (1987). The Courts of Appeals for
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits follow the Fifth Circuit and also require an ongoing
investigation at the time of the misconduct. See United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146,
152 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the inevitable
discovery exception applies when the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by
a private party. See United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 783 (1Ilth Cir.),
cert denied, 107 S. CL 3194 (1987). This holding seemingly contradicts the ongoing legal
investigation requirement, at least as formulated by the Fifth Circuit, because the Fifth
Circuit requires that the police were actively pursuing the alternative source for the evi-
dence. See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 932 (1987). The court stated, however, that because the private party had begun
the search at the time of the illegal conduct, the ongoing investigation requirement was
met. See Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d at 784.
Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has rejected an ongoing investi-
gation requirement, see United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 86-678) and suggests a
flexible approach to determining admissibility. See id.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied the inevitable discovery rule
without concern for the presence of an ongoing legal investigation. See United States v.
Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1497 (1986).
In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) there was an ongoing investigation, see id. at
448-49, but the majority opinion did not state that such an investigation is necessary for
the exception to apply.
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rights.6" Applying the inevitable discovery rule to primary evidence sub-
stantially weakens the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, and may
render fourth amendment rights meaningless. If the police possess the
means to acquire evidence legally, but the illegal route is faster and eas-
ier, they are not deterred from obtaining the evidence illegally because
the prosecution can argue that the evidence is admissible under the inevi-
table discovery exception. Two examples illustrate the problem.
The clearest illustration occurs when evidence seized in a warrantless
search is admitted because the police could have obtained a warrant.
Some courts have admitted illegally obtained evidence on the basis that a
warrant inevitably would have issued.6" Other courts, however, have re-
60. The Constitution does not expressly provide a remedy for fourth amendment vio-
lations. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Thus, the exclusionary rule was created to deter
fourth amendment violations. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Although some
states enacted criminal sanctions for violations of the fourth amendment, see Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 n.7 (1961) (citing statutes), experience demonstrated that these
remedies were futile. See id. at 652-53. Civil remedies such as a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and internal police discipline also have proved inadequate to prevent un-
constitutional conduct. See Amsterdam, supra note 42, at 360 & nn.137-38; Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an
"Empirical Proposition?", 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 617-20 (1983); Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1386-89 (1983).
61. See United States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (evi-
dence discovered in illegal search admissible because at time it was discovered application
for warrant was being prepared and evidence would have been discovered when warrant
was issued), aff'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987); State v. Butler, 676
S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (illegal warrantless search of premises does not
require exclusion in view of Williams I inevitable discovery doctrine, for "a search war-
rant could have been obtainable").
Some courts have invoked the inevitable discovery exception to admit evidence that
had been discovered during an illegal search and subsequently was seized pursuant to a
valid warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55
U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 86-678); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d
589, 603-04 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); United States v. Merri-
weather, 777 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1497 (1986); United
States v. Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 816
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987).
These courts confuse the distinction between the two exceptions and applied the inevi-
table discovery exception when the evidence had an actual independent source. If the
evidence is not seized in the illegal search, but seized pursuant to a later-issued warrant,
the independent source exception is the applicable rule of law. See Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (under independent source exception evi-
dence "was, in fact, obtained by fully lawful means"); see also supra note 9 (discussing
independent source exception). When, however, the evidence is seized illegally the subse-
quent issuance of a warrant merely provides a "hypothetical independent source" or inev-
itable discovery theory of admissibility. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (under inevitable discovery exception evidence "has not actually
been obtained from an independent source").
Perhaps, these courts have invoked the inevitable discovery exception because the evi-
dence would be inadmissible under the independent source exception. See Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-14 (1984) (evidence viewed in illegal search and subse-
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fused to apply the inevitable discovery exception on these grounds.62
They reason that admitting the evidence would emasculate the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment.63 If the police have probable
cause' sufficient to obtain a warrant, they can bypass the requirement of
submitting an affidavit to a neutral magistrate65 and conduct a warrant-
less search and seizure. The evidence would be admissible upon a show-
ing that a warrant inevitably would have issued. Moreover, when a
warrant actually issues subsequent to the illegal search,66 the govern-
ment's argument of inevitability is airtight, and the police receive the
quently seized pursuant to valid warrant is inadmissible); infra notes 89 & 101 and ac-
companying text (independent source exception does not apply to primary evidence).
62. See United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117
(1985); United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1050 (1974); State v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985),
cert. granted, 717 P.2d 504 (1986); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 218-19, 415
N.E.2d 818, 822-23 (1981); State v. Hatton, 389 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 697-98, 422 N.E.2d 531, 536, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876
(1981); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629 (N.D. 1981); State v. Crossen, 21 Or.
App. 835, 838, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (1975).
63. See, eg., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (admit-
ting evidence because warrant was later obtained, "would practically destroy the require-
ment that a warrant for the search of a home be obtained before the search takes place")
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); United States v. Griffin, 502
F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (admitting evidence found in illegal search "because
[the police] planned to get a search warrant and had sent an officer on such a mission,
would... tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment"), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); State v. Hatton, 389 N.W.2d
229, 234 (Minn. CL App. 1986) (refusing to admit evidence on basis that police could
have obtained a search warrant because "[i]f police are allowed to search when they
possess no lawful means and are only required to show that lawful means could have been
available even though not pursued, the narrow 'inevitable discovery' exception would
'swallow' the entire Fourth Amendment protection.").
64. Probable cause exists when a reasonable person would "conclude from the facts
and circumstances that a crime occurred or that evidence of a crime is located in the
place to be searched." J. Hall, supra note 3, § 5:8, at 148. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
65. The essence of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is that, when-
ever possible, a neutral and detached magistrate must issue a warrant before the govern-
ment substantially invades an individual's right to privacy. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97
(1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964). This requirement seeks to assure
the "detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
3337 (U.S. June 2, 1986) (No. 86-678); United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 603-04
(lst Cir. 1985), cerL granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); United States v. Merriweather, 777
F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1497 (1986); United States v.
Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 306 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); United States v.
Levasseur, 620 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 37
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benefit of acquiring the evidence earlier than they legally could have and
without complying with the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.
Admitting primary evidence on the basis of an inevitable inventory
search similarly undermines the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
Many courts recently have admitted evidence seized in an illegal search
because the police inevitably would have discovered the evidence in an
inventory search.67 An inventory search is a search conducted for ad-
ministrative purposes68 rather than a criminal investigative purpose.69
Because of the administrative purpose, inventory searches may be con-
ducted without a warrant or probable cause,70 but they must be con-
ducted in accordance with established inventory procedures,71 and the
police cannot have discretion in deciding whether to conduct such
searches.72 Police routinely conduct inventory searches of vehicles that
have been impounded.73 It is also normal police practice to conduct an
inventory search at the station-house of any container in the possession
of an arrestee.74 The inevitability of an inventory search is irrefutable
because, to be non-discretionary, police regulations must require the po-
lice to conduct the search.75 As a result, if the inevitable discovery rule is
applied to primary evidence, whenever the police are required to conduct
an inventory search, they need not conduct it at the station-house.
7 6
(2d Cir. 1987). See supra note 61 (explaining that eventual issuance of warrant does not
necessarily mean independent source exception applies).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Woolbright, 641 F. Supp. 1570, 1577-78 (E.D. Mo. 1986); District of Columbia
v. M.M., 407 A.2d 698, 702 (D.C. 1979); State v. Ferguson, 678 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984); Carlisle v. State, 98 Nev. 128, 129-30, 642 P.2d 596, 597-98 (1982) (per
curiam); Clough v. State, 92 Nev. 603, 604-05, 555 P.2d 840, 841 (1976) (per curiam);
State v. Turner, 91 A.D.2d 646, 646-47, 456 N.Y.S.2d 831, 831-32 (2d Dep't 1982); State
v. Pollaci, 68 A.D.2d 71, 79-80, 416 N.Y.S.2d 34, 40-41 (2d Dep't 1979); State v. Nelson,
127 Misc. 2d 583, 587, 486 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984-85 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
68. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976). The administrative purpose that justifies inventory searches is
threefold: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; the
protection of the police against claims of lost or stolen property; and the protection of the
police from potential danger. See Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987); Illinois
v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976).
69. See Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 742, 743 (1987); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376 (1976); id.
at 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. See Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 740, 741; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643; Opperman, 428
U.S. at 373.
71. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646, 647, 648; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372.
72. See Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 743; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648; Opperman, 428 U.S. at
383 (Powell, J., concurring); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973).
73. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 376 (1976).
74. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 642 (1983).
75. See Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738, 742 n.6, 743 (1987).
76. An inventory search of a container in the possession of an arrestee is reasonable,
in part, because it is conducted at the station-house. See Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645-46. A
search that would be considered reasonable at the station-house might be considered un-
reasonable if conducted in a public place. See id.
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They can conduct a search immediately upon arrest in violation of the
constitutional limitations on the scope of a search incident to arrest."
Moreover, the search need not be conducted in accordance with the le-
gally required procedures that justify the inventory search.78
Thus, the application of the inevitable discovery exception to primary
evidence permits the exception to swallow the exclusionary rule and evis-
cerates the fourth amendment.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIMARY EVIDENCE UNDER THE
INDEPENDENT SOURCE EXCEPTION
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the inevitable discovery excep-
tion should not apply to primary evidence. The Court has held that the
closely related independent source exception cannot be invoked to admit
primary evidence.79
The independent source exception admits illegally obtained evidence if
the same evidence was also discovered through an independent legal
source.8° It is well established that the inevitable discovery exception is
merely a "hypothetical independent source" exception. 8 If any distinc-
tion is to be made between the two doctrines, the inevitable discovery
exception should be more limited because it is based in many cases on
speculation. 82
77. See id. See generally, J. Hall, supra note 3, §§ 8:13-8:25 (discussing limitations on
scope and timing of legitimate search incident to arrest).
78. The essential purpose of an inventory search is safekeeping of the property. See
supra note 68.
If the search is not conducted in accordance with required procedures, which usually
include preparing a detailed list of the items, see, eg., Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738,
740, 742 n.6 (1987), then the safekeeping purpose that justifies the inventory search has
not been achieved.
79. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967); Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 813-14 (1984) (direct product of illegal conduct is inadmissible despite in-
dependent source exception) (dictum); see also In re Javier, 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 926,
206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 394 (1984) (independent source rule is exception to "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine).
Commentators treat the independent source exception as an exception to the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine. See J. Hall, supra note 3, § 22:5, at 629; 4 W. LaFave, supra
note 3, § 11.4, at 374; Pitler, supra note 3, at 624-25; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note
6, at 159 n.477; Criminal Procedure, supra note 9, at 392.
80. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); see also
J. Hall, supra note 3, § 22:5, at 630 n.17 (citing cases that have applied independent
source exception).
81. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 438 (1984); Note, Nix v. Williams- The
Supreme Court's Inevitable Discovery of the Inevitable Discovery Rule, 1985 Det. C. L
Rev. 137, 142 n.39; Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 121 n.25; Note, supra note 11; see
also In re Javier, 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 926, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 394 (1984) (inevitable
discovery exception is variation of independent source exception); supra note 9 (more
descriptive appellation of inevitable discovery exception is "hypothetical independent
source" exception).
82. See Williams II, 467 U.S. 431, 458-59 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that because inevitable discovery exception requires hypothetical finding, burden of proof
should be greater than for independent source exception); Supreme Court, supra note 9, at
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In Gilbert v. California,13 the Court held that the independent source
exception cannot be used to admit primary evidencea 4 In Gilbert, the
defendant was identified in a police line-up in violation of his sixth
amendment right to counsel.8 5 He was identified subsequently in court
by the same witnesses who had identified him at the line-up.86 The Court
held that it was constitutional error to admit the in-court identifications
without first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal line-
up. 7 The Court remanded the case to afford the state an opportunity to
establish that the derivative evidence - the in-court identifications -
had an independent source.88 The primary evidence - the testimony
that the witnesses had identified the defendant at the line-up - was ex-
cluded automatically.8 9 Because the line-up testimony was the direct
product of the illegal conduct, or primary evidence, the state was not
entitled to an opportunity to show that the testimony had an independent
source.90 The Court concluded that "[o]nly a per se exclusionary rule as
to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforce-
ment authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right .... 1
Later, in Segura v. United States,92 the Court reiterated the distinction
between primary and derivative evidence.9 3 In Segura, the police ille-
gally entered the defendant's apartment while they waited for a search
warrant to issue.94 During the illegal occupation of the premises, the
officers observed certain incriminating items in plain view." In the
129; Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Developments as Viewed Through Its
Exceptions, 31 U. Miami L. Rev. 615, 627 (1977); Note, supra note 11, at 155 (inevitable
discovery exception requires "speculative method of analysis").
83. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
84. See id. at 273.
85. See id. at 269-70.
86. See id. at 271.
87. See id. at 272.
88. See id.; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967) (giving state
opportunity to prove that in-court identifications-derivative evidence-had independent
source).
89. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273; see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 240 & n.32 (noting that
earlier, in Gilbert, the Court required per se exclusion of witness' testimony concerning
line-up identification, which was primary evidence).
90. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
93. Although the admissibility of the primary evidence was not an issue before the
Court, the majority opinion stated that the primary evidence would not be admissible.
See id. at 804.
94. See id. at 802.
95. See id. at 800-01. The mere observance of evidence in "plain view" does not
constitute a search for the purposes of the fourth amendment. See Arizona v. Hicks, 107
S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (1987); J. Hall, supra note 3, § 3:10, at 63. The plain view doctrine
requires, among other things, a prior valid intrusion into the suspect's privacy. See Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). Although the Court in Segura re-
ferred to the evidence observed in the illegal entry as being in "plain view," Segura, 468
U.S. at 801, the evidence was not admissible under the plain view doctrine because the
intrusion had not been valid. See id. at 804.
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search pursuant to the warrant, the agents seized both the plain view
evidence and evidence that had not been discovered during the illegal
entry.96 Although the evidence that had not been observed during the
illegal entry was tainted by the illegality, it was held admissible under the
independent source exception.97 The plain view evidence was not admit-
ted and the Court stated in dictum that primary evidence is "plainly sub-
ject to exclusion." 98
The justification for the inevitable discovery exception is based on the
rationale of the independent source exception.99 Both the independent
source exception and the inevitable discovery exception seek to put the
police in the position they would have occupied if the illegal conduct had
not occurred."00 Admittedly, excluding primary evidence from the scope
of the inevitable discovery exception would put the police in a worse po-
sition. The exclusion of independently discovered, primary evidence,
however, also puts the police in a worse position. Since the Supreme
Court has not invoked the status quo ante rationale to admit primary
evidence under the independent source exception,'01 it is consistent with
the Court's precedent to refuse to extend the inevitable discovery excep-
tion to primary evidence. It is illogical to admit primary evidence under
either of these exceptions because the status quo ante rationale is based
on deterrance, and there is no deterrence if the evidence is not ex-
cluded.'02 Moreover, it is necessary to put the police in a worse position
to deter illegal searches and seizures, 10 3 given the potential for using the
inevitable discovery exception to obviate the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment, limitations on searches incident to arrest, and inven-
tory search procedures.
Due to the relationship between the independent source and inevitable
discovery exceptions, it should not be permissible to admit primary evi-
96. Segura, 468 U.S. at 801.
97. See id. at 814 ("The valid warrant search was a 'means sufficiently distiguishable'
to purge the evidence of any 'taint' arising from the entry.") (quoting Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 1963)).
98. Id. at 804.
The Court's statement was dictum because the admissibility of the plain view evidence
was not challenged by the government. See id.
Despite the dictum in Segura that plain view evidence is inadmissible even if it has an
independent source, a number of courts have reached the opposite result. See supra note
61 (citing cases and suggesting that these courts evade dictum in Segura by applying
inevitable discovery exception rather than independent source exception).
99. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) rationale of independent source
exception "is wholly consistent with and justifies our adoption of the ultimate or inevita-
ble discovery exception to the exclusionary rule").
100. See id. at 442-43.
101. See United States v. Segura, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 273 (1967); see also Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 6, at 159 n.477 & 160
n.478 (independent source exception only applies to derivative evidence).
102. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 6, at 160.
103. See 4 W. LaFave, supra note 3, § 11.4(a), at 383; Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra
note 6, at 160.
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dence under the inevitable discovery exception when it would be imper-
missible to admit the same evidence under the independent source
exception.
CONCLUSION
The inevitable discovery rule already is overboard. Applying it to pri-
mary evidence completely undermines the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically limited
the inevitable discovery exception to derivative evidence, the Court has
limited the closely related independent source exception to derivative evi-
dence. It is illogical to extend the "hypothetical independent source"
exception to evidence that would be inadmissible under the independent
source exception. The Supreme Court should clarify that the inevitable
discovery exception does not apply to the direct products of illegal
conduct.
Jessica Forbes
